




















































































Thank you to everyone that 
helped this dissertation see 








Este estudo pretende aferir a relação entre o prémio pago numa fusão pela empresa 
alvo e o nível de ações prórias controladas pela empresa adquirente. Os dados cobrem 
870 fusões efetuadas em capital na Europa e nos Estados Unidos da America entre 2010 
e 2019. 
Os resultados são inconclusívos se o prémio pago pela empresa adquirente varia com 
o nível de ações próprias controladas pela empresa adquirente. No entanto, a relação é 
negativa para prémios calculados tendo em conta o preço médio da empresa adquirente 
entre o dia em que a fusão é anunciada e o dia anterior. Considerando o prémio pago 
tendo em conta o preço das ações no dia do anúncio da fusão, ou a média dos preços da 
semana anterior ao anúncio  ou a média dos preços do mês anterior ao anúncio, então a 
relação negativa deixa de ser estatisticamente significante. 
Os resultados deste estudo permitem uma melhor compreensão do prémio oferecido 
pela empresa adquirente numa aquisição o que, tendo em conta que o prémio pode ser 
uma das razões que leva ao insucesso de fusões, pode permitir que a taxa de insucesso 
das fusões diminua futuramente.   
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Fusões; Preço prémio; Controlo interno . 





This study aims to assess the relationship between the premium paid in a merger for 
the target company and the level of inside ownership of the acquirer. Data covers 870 
cash deals in Europe and in the USA between 2010 and 2019.  
Results are inconclusive whether the premium paid by the acquiring company changes 
depending on acquirer’s level of inside ownership. Nevertheless, the relationship is 
negative for premiums computed considering the average price of the target company 
between the day of the announcement and the day before the announcement. Narrowing 
the analysis to the premium paid against the stock price at the announcement date, one-
week average, or one-month prior the announcement, then the negative relationship is no 
longer statistically significant. 
The results of this study allow a better understanding of the premium paid by the 
acquiring company on a takeover which, considering that premium can be a reason why 
mergers fail, may help decrease the rate of merger failure in the future.   
KEYWORDS: Mergers; Premium Price; Inside Ownership. 
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In 2017, the number of mergers transactions was the highest ever recorded, with 
over 52 000 mergers deals being settled worldwide and with a corresponding combined 
deal value of almost 4 trillion USD (Institute for Mergers, 2018). 
However, several studies have revealed that mergers often do not end up as a 
successful strategy for the buying company. Such is the case of a KPMG study that 
mentions that around 83% of completed mergers studied failed to increase the 
participating shareholders' value in the subsequent years following the merger (KPMG, 
1999) and of a more recent Harvard Business Review 2016 report that refers that the 
failure rate of mergers and acquisitions sits between 70 percent and 90 percent (Martin, 
2016). 
This merger reality leads to the question of how can the rate of failure of mergers 
be so high and known for such a very long time, as the publishing year of the previous 
two studies reveal, and yet the number of mergers still is annually increasing? What are 
the reasons of mergers failure? The goal of this study is to explore the topic of merger 
failure, namely the role premium paid has on merger failure and if the premium changes 
with the percentage of insider ownership, being an insider, any holder representing 5% 
more of the total shares outstanding or any officers, members of the board of directors 
(including their related or affiliated individuals, families, entities and trusts). 
The fact that managers continue to see mergers as good strategies for the 
companies they run despite the low chances of success, makes studying and 
understanding better mergers and the factors that influence their success or failure a 
priority in order to mitigate the risks and increase the success rate. 
There exists, already, an extensive number of studies done on the field of mergers 
and acquisitions, ranging from several decades ago up to this day, trying to explain why 
mergers are often unsuccessful (Renneboog & Vansteenkiste, 2019) but the high rates of 
failure imply that it still remains some unawareness regarding mergers and acquisitions.  
Therefore, considering some studies that show how the price paid by the acquiring 
company during a takeover is a critical factor for its future success or failure, such is the 




the recent Kraft/Heinz merger (2015) that had the acquiring company admitting they 
overpaid for the takeover after the bad results the combined company has been 
demonstrating, it is hypothesized that the amount that is paid over the company’s market 
value may be related to the level of the acquiring company’s inside ownership.  
This study analysed 870 friendly takeovers in Europe and the United States made in 
cash between 2010 and 2019. The premium paid was computed using four different time-
periods to calculate the average value of the company. All achieved the result that 
supports the existing literature of the level of ownership of the target company, already 
controlled by the acquiring company, having a negative impact on the premium. Only 
when the premium computed considered the target company’s average stock price of the 
week and of the month previous to the announcement date, the ratio cash to assets became 
relevant with a positive impact on the premium. When the premium considers only the 
day before the announcement date to reach an average value, also the fact that the acquirer 
is based in the United States becomes relevant with a positive impact on premium and the 
level of inside ownership becomes significant with a negative impact on the premium. 
These results allow the conclusion that it is possible that the level of inside ownership is 
negatively associated with the premium, being the contribution of this study to existing 
literature that the higher the control of insiders, the less they will pay. This is important 
for managers and shareholders during a takeover because if inside ownership is low, the 
premium will tend to be higher and it can happen a scenario of overpayment, however 
with the conclusion of this study, managers and shareholders can actively work to counter 
that overpayment. 
The study structure is the following: literature regarding why companies merge will 
be addressed and then it will focus on explaining bidding premium as one of the reasons 
mergers fail. Following, it will go through the impacts of managerial ownership on the 
company and finally will present the empirical study of the impact of the level of inside 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Why companies merge? 
A manager that is interested in taking over another company can offer a price to 
the management of the target company (friendly takeover) or go directly to the market to 
purchase shares from shareholders (hostile takeover). Then, if his offer is accepted, a 
merger will happen and the acquirer will take control and incorporate both firm operations 
and management into a single one. 
As Manne (2009) detailed, mergers were considered to be a market mechanism to 
fix inefficiencies in the companies as companies that were inefficiently managed would 
show a lower stock price than what the market considered to be the right price and so an 
outsider entity, believing to be able to increase the company’s price, would target and 
acquire it. Therefore, the more an outsider believed the company to be undervalued the 
higher the potential gains of acquiring it and the greater the attractiveness of a merger.  
However, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) stated that the disciplining of 
underperforming management was more prominent on hostile takeovers and that, instead, 
on friendly takeovers, the acquisitions were mostly driven by the potential synergies from 
combining both firms’ operations. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) studies also supported it by concluding that synergies were the major  
motive that lead managers to take over other companies. 
This was also observed by Brouthers, Van Hastenburg and Van Den Ven (1998) 
who surveyed managers on their main reasons for acquiring another company. The results 
showed that most were aiming to increase their company’s market power and 
shareholder’s profitability through the synergies between the two companies, as the 
output and efficiency would be greater from combining the companies, deriving these 
synergies from marketing and operational economies of scale or reductions in the cost 
structure.  Other prevalent reasons for takeovers were revealed such as the acquiring of 
new information/data or technologies that belong to the target company, the increases in 




company and the diversification of businesses to decrease the company risk or to enter in 
a different market. 
However, empirical studies concerning mergers are mixed on whether they are a 
good strategy or not for the acquiring company.  More often than not, mergers end up 
destroying the acquiring company value, as observed by Gugler et al. (2003), who by 
using data from several European countries, found that acquiring companies that have 
their profits and efficiency decreased amount for the larger proportion of mergers. Hitt, 
Ireland and Harrison (2001) study also shows, on average, added value coming from 
mergers is little to none and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) evidenced that 
acquiring companies’ shareholders lose wealth around acquisitions announcements due 
to negative synergies gains by firms with extremely high valuations and poor performance 
occurring after a takeover. These conclusions were reinforced by  Hitt et al. (2001) who 
demonstrated that in the five years following most acquisitions, shareholders wealth 
remains the same or may decrease and also by Furfine and Rosen (2011) that reported 
that, on average, mergers increase the default risk of the acquiring firm. 
Therefore, if the potential benefits of mergers seem so many, why are the rates of 
unsuccessful mergers so high?  
 
2.2. Why are mergers unsuccessful? 
Many factors can lead a takeover to failure and most of the times those factors are 
related to inside reasons such as improper management. Martin (2016) showed that one 
main reason why mergers fail is due to managers focusing too much on what they can 
benefit from a merger operation instead of focusing on making the procedure work. Poor 
planning being an argument for mergers failures is also supported by the work of Cosh et 
al., (1989), who report that in the three to five years prior to a merger most acquiring 
companies showed abnormal extra returns, and of Jensen (1986) who also revealed a 
negative relationship between the acquiring company cash holdings prior takeover and 
the post-merger performance that led to the conclusion that extra cash available may push 
a manager to rush a merger strategy without the proper planning and assessment of risks 




represented by the lack of investment alternatives and are more prone to make bad 
acquisitions.   
Managers can also be a reason for mergers failing when managers prefer to act on 
their own self-interest instead of taking decisions that are in the stakeholders’ best 
interest. This can be observed when they do not return excess cash to shareholders and 
opt for bad takeovers strategies instead (Michael Jensen, 1986). Managers have an 
incentive for this type of behavior as acquisitions usually increase the managers 
compensation even when shareholders’ wealth declines (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Grinstein 
& Hribar, 2004). 
Managers poor judgment during takeover scenarios can also be caused by hubris 
according to Goergen and Renneboog (2004) as one third of the largest European mergers 
in the 1990s suffered from the managers’ expectations of the synergies being higher than 
the ones observed. Malmendier and Tate (2005) report also found that less profitable 
mergers occur more frequently when optimistic managers are in control. 
Other factors may influence the performance of a merger such as: an insufficient 
or wrong analysis of the potential value creation and synergies or a bad assessment of 
specific risks and benefits which then can result in less returns or even losses of 
performance after merger (Salter and Weinhold, 1978; Roll, 1986; Sirower, 1997); there 
could also be employee resistance to the combined entry and clash of different 
organizational cultures that may difficult the process of integration and operations of both 
firms into a single one (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999); cross-border mergers (Seth et al., 
2000)  and the difference in size (Ingham et al., 1992) may also decrease chances of 
success of mergers and if the workforce of the merged company  decreases, it may lead 
to poorer performance post acquisition (Krishnan, Hitt and Park 2007).   
 
2.3. The impact of bidding price 
Another main determinant of mergers success is the price that is offered to pay 
for the target company.  
When a company is considering acquiring another, it must decide the way the 




with the target’s management, which is referred to as a friendly takeover. Instead, he can 
go directly to the target company’s shareholders in the market, and offer to buy their 
shares in what it is called as tender offer or hostile takeover (DePamphilis, 2019). Either 
way, the final bid price will be a deciding factor of the offer, so the bidder usually offers 
an amount above the market value of the company to convince the target company to sell 
their holdings. This amount is called the bid premium, being defined as the ratio of the 
ultimate price paid per target share divided by the price before the takeover 
announcement. 
Bidding premium can be a critical determinant on whether a merger is successful 
or not in the future. Some studies reveal high bidding premiums can put a large burden 
on the acquiring firms and lead to increased chances of negative performance, due to the 
inability to earn enough returns beyond the premium paid for the takeover (Datta et al., 
1992). On this note, Sirower (1997) reports acquisition premiums to inversely affect 
acquirers’ shareholder returns for up to 4 years following the merger and that around 70% 
of acquiring firms fail to deliver enough returns to breakeven from the premium payment. 
Newer studies also support this, such is the case of  Abhyankar, Ho and Zhao (2005) who 
studied 305 merges in UK from 1985 to 2000 and found that overpayment is a possible 
reason for post-merger underperformance,  Nnadi and Aghanya (2018) who studied 
European deals between 2000-2013 and found that premium has a negative impact on 
short-term performance and also on the long-run but less pronounced and Tarasovich 
(2014) also studied pharmaceutical and biotechnology mergers from 1998 to 2005 and 
found that acquisition premiums are positively related to long term underperformance of 
the buying companies.  
Acquiring firms having trouble recovering from the costs of the price they paid 
during the takeover is no surprise when we observe that on average, the premium paid 
ranges between 40% and 50% over the share market price (Laamanen & Keil, 2008) and, 
not uncommonly, premium can even be higher than 100% (Jensen, 1988; Betton, Eckbo 
and Thorburn, 2009). Varaiya and Ferris (1987) research also revealed that during the 
1980s, 67% of the completed takeovers had targets being overpaid for. As concrete 
examples of the overpaying cases, there is the takeover of the company Federated 
Department Stores, that occurred with a premium paid of 124-percent which lead to the 




payments originating from the acquisition (Kaplan, 1989) and the takeover of Kraft by H. 
J. Heinz Co. in 2015 that had the CEO of  Heinz expressed regret concerning the merger 
stating they paid too much for it. At the time,  Kraft was valuated at $62.6 billion and had 
a combined value on the stock market worth $89 billion (James Fontanella-Khan, 2019) 
only to be down to $41.6 billion and in cost-cutting strategies in early 2019.  
Managers usually decide the price they will offer for the target company by 
looking into the market price of the target stocks and analyzing the company. The market 
price usually is the minimum threshold for the offer, since no shareholder would generally 
accept to sell their stocks below that value. In the perspective of the bidding company, 
usually, this is an undervalued representation of the potential value of the target company 
as it does not reflect the potential synergies surging with the merger and is, usually, the 
reason why a merger is attractive to them in the first place (Roll, 1986).  
The price premium is a significant reason to explain mergers failing, but despite 
this, it is one of the less explored by literature.  Sirower (1997) stated that for a merger to 
be successful in the long run, the premium price should be inferior to the combined 
synergies that would arise from merging (maximum threshold for the payment), assuming 
that if the price is above those synergies the acquirer will not generate enough returns to 
overcome the buying expenditure which would become a burden for the company. In 
these synergies it is reflected the estimated increase in value derived from aspects such 
as new corporate structure, improved management, cost reductions in labor or capital 
equipment, debt tax shields, market power, market access and knowledge and other 
economic factors (Harris et al., 2005; Lang et al., 1989). The combined synergies are 
often an estimate, and so they rely on future projections, assumptions and on the 
information available at the time. The acquiring management analyzes these factors and 
then settles on a price to offer. However, more often than not, merged companies are not 
able achieve the expected synergies and the offered price ends ups being too high in 
reality (Hitt et al., 2009) and companies have a hard time recovering. 
Contrariwise, Ismail (2011) indicated that synergies are not the main reason that 
explains the high premium paid, and that instead acquiring firms are more likely to 




potential and higher premerger operating performance. The author also demonstrated how 
these mergers end up destroying the acquiring company shareholders wealth. 
Roll (1986) proposed that another main reason for price premium to be set too 
high was due to the managers’ self-confidence with what is known as the hubris 
hypothesis. The author considered that bid offers suggest that bidders estimate the target 
company’s potential value to be higher than the current one, if this was not the case then 
the bidder would not have interest to the bid on the company on the first place. This would 
mean that in the takeover cases where managers overpay, in reality, what happened was 
that they offered that high bid because they were too self-confident that their inflated 
valuation was correct. Data from bid companies, prior to bidding, revealing extra returns 
and higher amounts of cash supports the hubris hypothesis as the good performance could 
fuel the manager with self-confidence and lead him to overpay. Other authors tested the 
role of hubris on premium and got similar results such as Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson 
(2002) and Yang (2015). 
 Hambrick and Hayward (1997) continued Roll’s study and considered different 
ways CEO’s hubris could manifest and its effects on the bidding premium. Examining 
organizations success, media praise for the CEO and CEO’s self-importance as proxies 
to analyze the CEO’s hubris, they demonstrated them to be significant.  The more 
prominent these factors the higher the CEO hubris would be which would reflect on a 
higher premium. The study also had significant results concerning when a CEO was in 
the board chair as well or when the proportion of inside directors increases, concluding 
both would increase a CEO’s hubris. Their study also reported that the larger the premium 
paid for an acquisition, the worse the subsequent performance of the acquiring firm. 
  As an alternative to hubris, Sirower (1997) suggested that instead, mergers’ high 
failure rates was a consequence of badly executed due diligences that would lead to an 
unfamiliarity with critical elements of the acquisition strategy, lack of adequate 
knowledge of the target company, and unexpected problems that occur in the integration 
process. 
Premium offered is also a result of managers’ decision biases, as Baker, Pan and 
Wurgler (2009) evidenced, the most part of bidding managers use the values of target 




premiums with no empirical motive, meaning that if the number of weeks used to 
calculate the premium changed, then the premium would also change.  
Varaiya and Ferris (1987) and Coff (2003) also demonstrated that competition to 
acquire a company may increase premium paid. Each bidder estimates the added value 
from the merging synergies and offer a correspondent premium. The bidder who expected 
more synergies or overestimated the most the target’s value would have the winning bid. 
This is often called the “winner’s curse”. The authors suggested that investors that did not 
have it in consideration, would have their bid premium, on average, be higher than 
takeover gains and so, on average, the excess return for the winning bidder would be 
negative. The authors determined, also, that the higher the divergence of opinion between 
the bidders about estimated gains and the greater the degree of competition, then the larger 
the premium offered by the successful bidder would be.  
Another study by Dionne, La Haye and Bergerès (2015) suggested the divergence 
between opinions could be merely different access to information and that asymmetrical 
information would have an impact on bid premium. To test it, they looked for a relation 
between premium and bidders owning at least 5% of shares in target company 
(blockholders) before the acquirer’s first bid, as this would probably provide them with 
insider information not available to other bidders. The study’s results demonstrated that 
the presence of blockholders, usually, leads to less premium paid than bidders that do not 
own large amounts of target shares.  
Betton and Eckbo (2000) also expanded the impact of toeholds (i.e. investor 
owning shares of the target company before bidding) by evidencing that the higher the 
toehold, the lesser the number of shares needed to be bought at premium. There would 
also be less shareholders the investor would need to convince to sell their shares, thus 
decreasing the disparity of opinions regarding the shares’ worth from the shareholders’ 
side which would lead to a smaller premium. Their study also found a negative 
relationship between bidding premium and the target’s company equity size. 
Information asymmetry impact on the premium was also shown by Cheng, Li and 
Tong (2016) who showed that the higher the information asymmetry the higher the 
premiums. The reason being that opaque targets usually suffer from market discount 




asymmetry is bigger and the acquirer has access to more information about the target, the 
target will be priced at a smaller discount than the one allocated by the market. 
Interpersonal relations affecting bidding premium was also explored by 
Haunschild (1994) who hypothesized that interorganizational relationships between 
managers would affect how much investors choose to pay for a takeover. Was analyzed 
if company managers would look to their partners decisions and to professional firms 
dedicated to merger scenarios when deciding on the price offer. They concluded that 
acquirers would pay premiums levels similar to what managers they had a relationship 
with had paid and that investment bankers were using the same premium determining 
models to different companies resulting in premiums around the same level for companies 
that hired their service. Malhotra, Zhu and Reus (2015) also studied managers looking for 
outside inputs when deciding how much to pay and found evidence that managers use 
other recent mergers in the same market to anchor their acquisition price. 
Other studies showed how several other variables had an impact on premium paid. 
It was demonstrated by Slusky and Caves (1991) that premium would increase with the 
financial synergies expected from the takeover and the existence of actual and possible 
competitors for acquiring the target company.  Bugeja and Walter (1995) studied several 
other variables as possible influencers of the level of premium and found evidence of the 
performance of target company getting worse before the announcement, would lead to 
higher chances that a new management could improve it and increase returns and thus, 
making the takeover more desirable, increasing the premium managers were willing to 
offer. Also proved that bidder performance was a significant variable, showing that the 
higher the performance of the bidder management the higher the premium as synergies 
would probably be greater or the bidder would just have more money to offer. The level 
of initial ownership of the target company by the bidder was revealed to be relevant too, 
as the higher the percentage of shares owned the smaller the premium. The presence of 
higher levels of cash flow on the target company had a negative relation with premium 
and the higher borrowing capacity for the bidder proved to increase premium, as it is 
theorized by the authors that that bidders would have an easier time finding new funds 
for projects that increase value. Also, Schwert, (1996) found that tender offers, instead of 
directly negotiating with target company’s management, can originate higher premiums 




ratio of the target company being high leading to a higher bid premium and Alexandridis 
et al. (2013) found  a negative relationship between the premium paid in acquisitions and 
target size, indicating that takeovers of larger firms usually have a lower premium.   
 Walkling and Edmister (1985) also analyzed several variables and concluded that 
expected benefits for the merger have a positive impact on bid premium, higher 
bargaining power of the bidder would result in smaller bid premiums, companies with 
declining leverage and low valuation ratio usually bid higher premiums, the percentage 
of shares already controlled by the acquirer has a negative impact on premium (like 
previous mentioned studies referred), the bidding company seeking 50% of the target 
company’s shares or if the takeover is a nonconglomerate type leads to, also, a higher 
premium. The authors also demonstrated that the existence of competition for the target 
company impacts the premium positively. 
Bargeron et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of the bidder being a private or a public 
firm as they argued private equity firm managers could have higher incentives to close 
on a lower price or that public firms have greater costs related to withdrawing an offer so 
would commit more to complete the merge. The results showed premiums paid to public 
target companies is higher when the acquirer is a public firm and that a higher premium 
is paid by public bidders when target managerial and institutional ownership increases. 
Target company corporate social responsibility was also studied by Gomes and 
Marsat, (2018) and they found that acquirers value it positively, as they consider it a way 
to reduce information asymmetry and targets’ specific risk, which in turn leads to higher 
bid premiums.  
The CEO being a women and their degree of representation on boards of bidding 
and target companies were also factors that had an impact on the bid premium as it was 
statistically and economically smaller if the CEO is a woman and it decreases with the 
increase on the proportion of women directors on the target company board (Levi et al., 
2014). 
Therefore, considering that bidding price is a significant variable for the success 
of a merger, managers should try to understand as much as possible about what can affect 




this knowledge, this MFW proposes a different variable to have an impact on premium: 
the level of ownership of the acquiring company on their own company. 
 
3. INSIDE OWNERSHIP  
 
The impact of the board composition and managers holding shares of the company 
they manage is still inconclusive.  
Some studies show a clear impact such is the case of the study of Oswald and J. 
S. J. Jahera (1991) who evidenced that firm’s financial performance is significantly 
related with inside ownership1, demonstrated by the higher excess returns when 
ownership increases and of the study of Howton, Howton and Olson (2001) that 
demonstrated that initial returns after an IPO also are directly related to share ownership 
by insiders2 and the percentage of independent outsiders However, Krivogorsky (2006) 
study, despite finding that firms’ profitability ratios (ROE, ROA, MTB) have a strong 
positive relation with the level of relational ownership and the portion of independent 
directors on the board, the author did not found any evidence of the level of inside 
ownership3 having an effect in performance.  
The opposite effect was also demonstrated by different studies that revealed that 
the level of inside ownership could have, instead, a negative impact on a company. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) explained this negative impact using the agency theory. The agency 
theory states that managers, who should act as agents for owners or shareholders, may 
take actions that benefit themselves primarily instead of maximizing value for 
shareholders, such is the case of managers engaging on mergers that decrease 
shareholders’ wealth in order to get an increase in their remuneration, as mergers usually 
cause. This way, a higher degree of ownership or financial attachment (value of shares 
owned) could increase managers’ incentives to put their needs in first place. 
 
1Inside ownership considering the amount of shares belonging to the officers and directors of the firm. 
2 Inside ownership considering the amount of shares belonging to the board of directors. 





The negative effect on performance  can be, instead, a result of the reduced 
control, as the higher the level of shares owned by managers the less shares would be 
controlled by outsider shareholders, who usually control the management and push for 
firm’s efficiency (Grossman & Hart, 1986).    
Trautwein (1990) also supported agency theory by showing that managers may 
also pay larger premium for a takeover that will provide them with personal gains, despite 
it being a good strategy or not for the firm, as acquisitions increase the size of a firm and 
that often has an impact in the manager’s compensation and power.  
However, other study states that managerial ownership can instead decrease the 
agency problems, leading to an increase in the value of the firm by aligning the interests 
of the managers with the outside shareholders and working has an incentive to chase after 
value-maximizing behaviors (Seifert et al., 2005). 
Some studies report that given concerns about job security, a manager might tend 
to make less risky investment decisions, thus, adversely affecting the firm’s overall 
performance (Oswald and J. S. J. Jahera, 1991), however, different studies found 
managerial ownership to be positively related with risk-taking decisions (Chen and 
Steiner 1999), 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) study also revealed a statistically significant 
positive relation between outsider institutional ownership4 and the stockholder’s wealth 
and similarly that the existence of large shareholders would lead to better monitoring of 
managers and overall firm performance.  
Morck, Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, (1988) analyzed the impact of managerial 
performance and achieved results of an increase in Tobin's Q as managerial ownership 
increases from 0% to 5%, then a fall as ownership increases to 25%, and then a final 
slower increase as ownership increases beyond 25%, reaching a conclusion of non-
linearity. McConnell and Servaes (1990), Kole  (1995) and Singh and Davidson (2003) 
also supported this conclusion and found non-linearity between inside ownership and 
company performance. 
 





Jahmani and Ansari, (2006) similarly found on their study no relationship between 
managerial ownership, firm performance and risk-taking, stating that managerial 
ownership is merely a reflection of the way in which managers receive their benefits and 
does not provide any incentive to work harder for improving the company’s performance, 
while Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) also not finding a consistent relationship 
between insider ownership and performance, state that there are some significant 
associations that may happen due to different local laws or local business environment. 
Considering the existent literature, it is not certain the impact of the level of inside 
ownership of the bidding company on the company’s performance and what impact, if 
any, there would be on bidding premium and that is what this study aims to explore.  
Managers owning a higher share of the company can imply that they have more 
“skin in the game” and so are more exposed to the company’s performance. Although, it 
is a possibility that a bigger ownership and exposure can act as incentives for managers 
to be more cautious with the premium they pay, as paying too much might be too risky 
considering their ownership position, as they would be putting the company in a bad state 
if they overpay too much. A high level of insider ownership could also mean less control 
over managers by outsiders and a weaker supervision can lead to a less efficient 
management that ends up paying more in a takeover. Also, an overconfident manager left 
unchecked from outsiders’ control or with enough decision power might result in higher 
premiums and overpaying. 
 
4. HYPOTHESIS  
Analyzing the literature, it is not possible to conclude for certain if an increase in 
inside ownership will have a positive or negative impact on a company’s performance. It 
could be argued that an increase in inside ownership would also increase how the interests 
of managers and shareholders are aligned or that managers would also be more exposed 
to how the company performs which would possibly lead to a decrease of the premium 
paid, however an increase in inside ownership could also mean less control for efficiency 
of managers by outside forces which in turn could lead to an increase in premium paid. 
This study aims to assess whether there is any association between the level of inside 




Hypothesis: The level of inside ownership of the bidding company is associated 
with the bidding premium. 
 
5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The following analysis is based on data retrieved from Bloomberg. The data 
covers 870 friendly takeovers in Europe and America paid in cash from 2010 to 2019.  
The sample contemplates mergers from 42 countries, being that around half of the 
mergers in the sample the acquiring company was based on the United States. The sectors 
with the largest representation were the Technology, Industrial and Consumer (non-
cyclical) sectors (TABLE I).  The yearly dispersion of the number of mergers is mostly 
equally divided between all years, however the years 2011 and 2012 show a higher 
occurrence of mergers than the average and during 2018 and 2019 there were less mergers 
in the sample than the average (TABLE II).  
The main variables used for the study are the percentage of shares owned by 
insiders of the bidder company at the announcement date, being insiders, any holders 
representing 5% more of the total shares outstanding or any officers, members of the 
board of directors and the premium offered by the acquirer. Other variables were also 
collected at the merger announcement date for the study: the nature of the bid, the 
percentage of shares that the acquirer already had of the target company, bidder’s market 
capitalization, cash and equivalents, total equity and total assets, debt to equity, return on 
equity and return on assets, acquirer country and acquirer industry sector. 
Some companies on the sample were involved in more than one merger, however, 
given that the studied topic is the association between premium and level of inside 
ownership, there is no reason to exclude these observations as that would not put at risk 
the results and it can also be analyzed what happens to the premium given the inside 
ownership level at the time of each merger.     
In this analysis were used Fixed Effects (FE) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 





(1) Premiumit = α0 + β1Insider Shares   +   β2Target Own.   +   β3Cash_to_Assets  
+ β4Market Book   +    β5logAssets  +  β6Debt to Equity   +   β7ROE  +   β8US  + εit 
 
Dependent Variable  
The acquisition premium percentage is the dependent variable and is calculated 
by applying the difference between the price paid per share and the company’s share price 
and then dividing it by the company’s share price. In order to account for any movement 
in the share price before the merger when calculating the premium it was used four 
alternative methods to compute the company’s value: the share price of the target 
company at the announcement date, the average between the share price at announcement 
date and the share price on the previous day, the average between the shares price at 
announcement date and one week before and the average between the shares price at the 
announcement date and one month before.  
These four methods were used to analyse if there would be any difference in the 
results and also because some literature states that by using more days to compute an 
average company value instead of just the value at the announcement date we can better 
pinpoint the company’s real value more accurately (Barclay and Warner, 1993) and it 
would be possible that the company value would be increasing up to the announcement 
date (Brigida & Madura, 2012), which in fact is observed in the sample. 
Analysing the premium (GRAPH I and TABLE III), it is possible to detect some 
differences between the different methods of calculating it. The mean changes with each 
method with 40.59% on announcement day, 36.88% on 1-day average premium, 38.14% 
on 1-week average and 41.59% on 1-month average. It can be observed that up until the 
announcement date, the target company value is decreasing and then picks up again. This 
increase may be caused by inside information regarding the merger being shared before 
its announcement that leads to an increase of the target company value share prices 
(Brigida & Madura, 2012; Haw et al., 1990; Jayaraman et al., 2001). 
Considering that these four ways of computing the premium will be our dependent 
variable it is important to perform some tests to study the normality of the residuals of 




of the four variables and was possible to notice that they follow a normal distribution 
(GRAPH II TO V), then it was also performed a Kernel Density estimation (GRAPH VI 
TO IX) and a standardized normal probability plot (GRAPH X TO XIII) to check the 
variables density and finally was done a Shapiro-Wilk test (TABLE IX) to test for 
normality for each variable, the results obtained were also optimist regarding the 
normality of premium paid, with a high enough test value to not reject the null-hypothesis 
of normality.  
 
Independent Variable  
The independent variable in this study is the level of inside ownership of the 
acquiring company, being hypothesized an association between it and premium paid. This 
association is not clear if it is positive or negative as some of the previously mentioned 
literature states that a high level of inside ownership may mean an increased performance 
of the company and more aligned interests of managers and shareholders which in turn 
would lead to smaller premium paid but other literature finds no relationship between 
performance and level of inside ownership and other literature even states that a high 
level of inside ownership would mean less control of outside forces which would result 
in a less efficiently managed company and lead to higher premium. 
For the level of inside ownership in this study was considered the percentage at 
the day of the merger announcement as other moments were also analysed up to 1 month 
prior the announcement date and no considerable changes were found. The percentage of 
inside ownership (Table IV) ranges between 0% to 90.22%, however most observations 
are low, resulting in a mean of 3.78%. 
 
Control Variables 
For control variables (Table V) this study considered several variables that 
previous literature has studied previously and with results that show a relationship with 
premium: 
Target Ownership - ownership that the bidder already had of the target company 




Return on Equity – the ratio of return on equity was used to control for profitability 
(Haunschild, 1994);  
Debt to equity – debt to equity ratio was used to account for leverage (Dionne et 
al., 2015);   
Market to Book – the market to book ratio to control for the market perspective of 
the company compared to the available business’s net assets (Walkling & Edmister, 
1985); 
Cash to Assets - ratio for bidder company to control for liquidity (Walkling & 
Edmister, 1985); 
Total Assets (log) - variable to control for the size of the company (Dionne et al., 
2015);  
US based acquirers - dummy variable to assess for U.S. based acquirers. 
 
Diagnostic tests 
This study considered four different ways of computing the premium, so the base 
regression was repeated 4 times for each of these different methods.  
After regressing the model, the independent variables tests were performed to 
check for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity.  
The fact that there are no correlation levels below -0.6 or above 0.6 on the 
correlation matrix (TABLE VI) shows there is no multicollinearity presence and, thus, 
the value of the coefficients and the interpretation of the independent variables are not at 
risk which increases the confidence in the model results. The variance inflation factor was 
also computed and it showed no signs of multicollinearity (TABLE VIII).  
Then it was tested the presence of heteroskedasticity, which exists when the 
standard errors of a variable, over a specific amount of time, are non-constant. Its 
presence can mean a less precise estimation and a lower precision increases chances that 
the coefficient estimates are far from the correct value. To check for heteroskedasticity 
presence, two tests were performed: a residual-versus-fitted plot (GRAPH XV to XVII) and 




As the residual-versus-fitted plot showed no signs of a pattern and the Cameron-
Trivedi decomposition test showed a small chi-square and a high p-value it is to conclude 
there is no relevant heteroskedasticity and there is homoscedasticity in the regressions.   
After regressing the base model, it was regressed a modified version to control 
for year (fixed effects) and then for year and industry. Using the base model, it was also 
used two modified version to study what would happen to premium if return on equity 
or cash to assets increase in a scenario where there is inside ownership.  
 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results of the tests when considering the four ways of calculating the premium 
displayed relevant differences (Table VII). 
When the premium at announcement date is considered for the base regression, 
only the variable percentage of the target already owned showed a significant negative 
relationship with premium. This implies that the more control the bidder has of the target 
company before the merger the less premium he would pay. This result is consistent with 
previous literature.  
When the premium of 1-week average price and the 1-month average price are 
considered on the base regression, the outputs are similar, but in addition to the variable 
concerning the percentage of the target already owned by the acquirer, the cash to assets 
ratio was also showed to be relevant with a positive relationship with premium. Meaning 
that the higher the liquidity of the acquirer, the higher the premium they pay, which is 
also consistent with previous literature.  
When the Premium of 1 Day average price is considered on the base regression, 
the results vary from the previous three and, besides the variable corresponding to the 
percentage of the target already owned and the cash to assets ratio, also the dummy 
relative to the acquirer being based in the United States becomes relevant with  a positive 
impact on premium and the variable in study corresponding to the percentage of inside 
ownership also becomes significant with a negative impact on premium. This means that 




level of inside ownership of the acquiring company increases then the premium will 
decrease. 
Tests were performed also where industry and year controls were added to the 
base regression, both individually and at simultaneous and the results remained the same 
for each of the four methods of calculating premium. 
It was also analyzed what would happen to premium if return on equity increased 
when there is inside ownership, and the results were not significant, however when there 
is inside ownership if cash to assets ratio increases the premium is positively impacted 
which is consistent with the previous results.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 The results of the empirical study regarding the impact of the level of inside 
ownership on the premium paid for a takeover to assess the hypothesis that there is an 
association between them are inconclusive. When the method of calculating the premium 
changes, the results also change. The difference between the methods is how the value of 
the target company is calculated in each one. When the premium is calculated considering 
the average price of the announcement date and the day before, the level of inside 
ownership shows a significant negative relationship with premium, meaning the higher 
the level of inside ownership, the lower the premium. When we consider the value at 
announcement date, the average value using the company values up to 1 week and to 1 
month the negative impact of the level of inside ownership is not relevant. The main 
justification for these differences is that the premium calculated considering the average 
price of 1 day before the announcement and the announcement date is considerably lower 
than the other three methods, as the target company value is considerably higher on the 
day before the announcement (Brigida & Madura, 2012).  
Given that the impact of inside ownership on premium has not been deeply 
explored by literature, this study would be a step in that direction. This study allows the 
perception that the inside ownership might have a role on how much premium is paid, 
with the increase of the level of inside ownership decreasing how much premium is paid. 
This would probably be caused by an increase of the align of interests of shareholders and 




of this study in mind, it is possible to understand better premium values with a new 
possible influencer like inside ownership. Shareholders and other exterior forces to the 
management, in the cases where inside ownership is low, as price paid would tend be 
higher, should overview and be more involved in the premium decision process to ensure 
that the premium is not too high.   
Considering that the relationship between level of inside ownership and premium 
was not studied deeply before, and given the mixed results of this study that change 
according to the method of calculating premium, perhaps as a future study this same 
hypothesis could be analyzed using a wider sample of mergers to determine if the results 
are the same. Also, another definition of inside ownership could be used, using a stricter 
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Table 1 presents the sectors distribution of the mergers in the sample studied. 
Acquirer Industry Sector Frequency Percentage 
Basic Materials 64 7.36 
Communications 84 9.66 
Consumer, Cyclical 90 10.34 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 242 27.82 
Diversified 6 0.69 
Energy 37 4.25 
Industrial 183 21.03 
Technology 140 16.09 
Utilities 24 2.76 
Total 870 100.00 
 
TABLE II 
Table II presents the dispersion of mergers in the sample per year. 
Year Frequency Percent 
2010 87 10.00 
2011 118 13.56 
2012 128 14.71 
2013 74 8.51 
2014 86 9.89 
2015 77 8.85 
2016 84 9.66 
2017 98 11.26 
2018 60 6.90 
2019 58 6.67  












                                 
 
TABLE III 
Table III depicts the basic descriptive statistics of the dependent variables to test in the 
regression analysis. 
Observations = 870 
ANNOUNCEMENT – PREMIUM ON ANNOUNCEMENT DATE; 1 DAY AVG – PREMIUM USING AVERAGE OF COMPANY VALUE ON 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATE AND 1 DAY BEFORE; 1 WEEK AVG - PREMIUM USING AVERAGE OF ALL COMPANY VALUES SINCE 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATE TO 1 WEEK BEFORE; 1 MONTH AVG - PREMIUM USING AVERAGE OF ALL COMPANY VALUES SINCE 














Announcement 40.59     27.50      0.12 145.74 22.45 34.39 52.94 
1 Day Avg 36.88 27.11 0.08 148.45 17.3984 31.28 51.13 
1 Week Avg 38.14 26.98 0.16 142.42 19.08 32.78   51.34 




GRAPH II                                        
Graph II depicts the histogram of the dependent variable Prem. at Announced Premium. 








Graph III depicts the histogram of the dependent variable Prem. 1 day avg 
 
 




GRAPH IV                                                         


















GRAPH VI                                                      
Graph VI presents the Kernel density estimation for Prem. At announcement date against 





























Graph IX presents the Kernel density estimation for Prem. 1 month avg. against the 
normal density. 


















Graph X presents a probability plot of the squared residuals for Prem. at announcement 






























GRAPH XIV  
Graph XIV presents the mean of Insider shares at announcement date (Ins_Shares_Out0), at one 
day before the announcement date (Ins_Shares_Out1), 1 week before the announcement date 


















Table IV depicts the basic descriptive statistics of the dependent variable to test in the regression 
analysis.  
Observations = 870 
Ins_Shares_Out0 – Inside ownership of the acquirer at announcement date; Ins_Shares_Out1 - Inside ownership 
of the acquirer 1 day before announcement date; Ins_Shares_Out7 - Inside ownership of the acquirer 7 days before 
announcement date; Ins_Shares_Out30 - Inside ownership of the acquirer 30 day before announcement date; 
TABLE V 
Table V depicts the basic descriptive statistics of independent variables to test in the regression 
analysis.  
Observations = 870 
TARGET OWN – LEVEL OF OWNERSHIP OF TARGET COMPANY BY ACQUIRER; TOTEQ – TOTAL EQUITY; ROE – RETURN ON 
EQUITY; ROA – RETURN ON ASSETS; DEBT TO EQ – DEBT TO EQUITY;  
 
Variable 




Ins_Shares_Out0 3.78      8.99   0 90.22 0.08 0.58 2.54 
Ins_Shares_Out1 3.78 8.99 0 90.22 0.08 0.58 2.54 
Ins_Shares_Out7 3.79 9.01 0 90.22 0.08 0.58 2.54 
Ins_Shares_Out30 3.78 8.97 0 90.08 0.08 0.57 2.54 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Target Own 
(%) 
10.94 24.10 0 99.78 0 0 0 
ROE (%) 16.83 23.28 -120.59 303.48 8.0351 14.31 21.37 
Debt to Eq 
(%) 
79.15 129.98 0 1904.85 21.28 50.12 88.53 
Market to 
Book (%) 
3.43 3.44 0.21 39.56 1.57 2.50 3.99 
Cash to 
Assets (%) 
11.21 10.10 0.01 77.60 4.17 8.63 14.88 






Table VI presents the correlation matrix of the independent variables. The correlation coefficients 
are shown and represent the strength and direction (positive or negative) of the linear relationship 















AP 1.0000        
Ins Shares Out -0.0482* 1.0000       
Target Owned -0.1904* 0.0418* 1.0000      
Cash to Assets 0.0680* 0.1180* -0.0365* 1.0000     
MB 0.0493* 0.0010 -0.0913* 0.0916* 1.0000    
logAssets 0.0199* -0.2930* -0.0260* -0.3633* 0.0596* 1.0000   
Debt to Eq -0.0235* 0.0498* -0.0183* -0.1703* 0.4686* 0.1591* 1.0000  
ROE 0.0558* -0.0419* -0.0904* 0.0536* 0.5886* 0.1398* 0.3806* 1.0000 



















Table VII presents the results for the regression model considering the four methods of calculating 
premium as dependent variable. 
  
AP    
Pre 
1Day Avg    
Pre 
1 Week Avg    
Pre 
1 Month Avg    
Ins Shares 
-0.110    -0.200*   -0.166    -0.128    
(0.254)    (0.012)    (0.057)    (0.191)    
          
Target Owned 
-19.46*** -16.87*** -17.89*** -19.72*** 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
          
Cash to 
Assets 
16.58    21.60*   20.92*   21.26*   
(0.084)    (0.039)    (0.041)    (0.033)    
          
MB 
0.141    -0.399    -0.308    0.116    
(0.736)    (0.237)    (0.392)    (0.779)    
          
logAssets 
0.364    -0.237    -0.0620    0.340    
(0.528)    (0.672)    (0.912)    (0.551)    
          
Debt to Eq 
-0.906    -0.706    -0.826    -0.897    
(0.217)    (0.299)    (0.218)    (0.221)    
          
ROE 
4.173    10.45    9.491    4.833    
(0.505)    (0.072)    (0.118)    (0.432)    
          
US 
2.434    4.034*   3.729    1.888    
(0.215)    (0.035)    (0.051)    (0.335)    
          
Constant 
36.20*** 37.04*** 36.92*** 36.70*** 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Observations 870 870 870 870 
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.049 
p-values in parentheses    










Table VIII presents the Variance Inflation Factor, which low value allows the conclusion of no 
multicollinearity. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
MB 1,81 0,5511 
ROE 1,61 0,6210 
Debt to Eq 1,42 0,7066 
logAssets 1,3 0,7721 
Cash to Assets 1,24 0,8070 
US 1,13 0,8885 
Ins. Shares Out 1,11 0,9006 
Target Owned 1,08 0,9250 
Mean VIF 1,34  
 
TABLE IX  
Table IX presents the Shapiro-Wilk W test results for each method of calculating the 














Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
AP 870 0.90583 52.319 9.744 0.00000 
Pre_1Day_Avg 870 0.91645 46.421 9.449 0.00000 
Pre_1Week_Avg 870 0.91651 46.389 9.448 0.00000 























The Graph XVI presents the residual-Versus-Fitted plot of Prem. 1 day avg. 
 
GRAPH XVII 















































The Graph XVII presents the residual-Versus-Fitted plot of Prem. 1 month avg. 
 
 






CAMERON-TRIVEDI DECOMPOSITION - PREM. AT ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
This test was performed to check for the presence of heteroskedasticity as it may lead to less precise estimations. The 
small chi-square obtained and high p-value allows the conclusion that there is no relevant heteroskedasticity 
Source chi2 df P 
Heteroskedasticity 22.11 43 0.9966 
Skewness 63.30 8 0.0000 
Kurtosis 20.09 1 0.0000 




CAMERON-TRIVEDI DECOMPOSITION - PREM. 1 DAY PRICE AVERAGE  
This test was performed to check for the presence of heteroskedasticity as it may lead to less precise estimations. The 
small chi-square obtained and high p-value allows the conclusion that there is no relevant heteroskedasticity 
Source chi2 df P 
Heteroskedasticity 26.51 43 0.9773 
Skewness 51.38 8 0.0000 
Kurtosis 10.48 1 0.0012 
























CAMERON-TRIVEDI DECOMPOSITION - PREM. 1 WEEK PRICE AVERAGE 
This test was performed to check for the presence of heteroskedasticity as it may lead to less precise estimations. The 
small chi-square obtained and high p-value allows the conclusion that there is no relevant heteroskedasticity 
Source chi2 df P 
Heteroskedasticity 28.02 43 0.9624 
Skewness 61.09 8 0.0000 
Kurtosis 11.31 1 0.0008 
Total 100.42 52 0.0001 
 
TABLE XIII 
CAMERON-TRIVEDI DECOMPOSITION - PREM. 1 MONTH PRICE AVERAGE 
This test was performed to check for the presence of heteroskedasticity as it may lead to less precise estimations. The 
small chi-square obtained and high p-value allows the conclusion that there is no relevant heteroskedasticity 
Source chi2 df P 
Heteroskedasticity 22.27 43 0.9963 
Skewness 65.98 8 0.0000 
Kurtosis 19.48 1 0.0000 
Total 107.73 52 0.0000 
 
